Features

Integrity and provenance Every file, checked against its official source

scancontainer classifies every file in a container image and compares it with the official signed package it claims to come from, so you know whether the image is intact, modified or carrying content nobody can explain.

What it finds

  • Package files that were modified after installation
  • Executables and libraries that belong to no package
  • A package database that was emptied, forged or tampered with
  • An image that poses as a different distribution
  • Added certificate authorities, extra root accounts and loader hijacking
  • Suspicious changes between two versions of the same image

What you get

  • A provenance map of the image, with counts by class
  • An integrity verdict: intact, modified or with unexplained content
  • A list of gaps: every file that could not be read
  • A comparison between versions, with what changed

What makes it different

The comparison is made against the package downloaded from the distribution's repository, with its signature chain verified. The checksums stored inside the image are not trusted, because an attacker can rewrite them.

Which plan includes it

Captain and above. Compare plans.

FAQ

Questions about this feature

Why not trust the checksums inside the image?

Because whoever modified a file can also rewrite its checksum. Comparing with the official signed package closes that door.

Do you verify image signatures?

Yes. Image signatures and provenance with Sigstore and cosign are checked.

More features

Scan yours before the next deploy.